THE WAY I SEE IT
by Don Polson Red
Bluff Daily News 7/18/2017
Musical campsites; war stories
Observing the passing scene of
campers is no small part of spending the summer in forest service campgrounds.
Over 14 to 16 days, everyone around us arrives and leaves.
Of course, our being retired
with no place cooler to hang out, we have time to compare. There are the means
of camping: from motorhomes like ours, to trailers of various sizes, to
so-called “fifth wheels,” pop-up tent trailers and the tents of every
imaginable size. People have their systems mostly down pat but not always;
personal belongings and sleeping bags go in the tents, camp chairs get
arranged, and the food-related stuff finds places on the picnic tables.
What never ceases to amaze us
is when, as just occurred next to us while I peck at the keyboard, a group of
adults with various aged children and friends, arrive mid day, set up, recreate
in their own style, eat dinner, make fire, wake up to breakfast—and then pack
it all up to move to the next stop. Repeat. That was Barbara’s dad’s routine;
we stay put for a while.
Generators: can’t live with
them or without them. There are rules; we abide; we don’t like listening to
ours more than needed. Some folks can’t seem to spend a waking minute in camp
without the darn thing running. To each their own; I just think they need
better batteries.
I like to include both fiction
and nonfiction in my reading fare; that way my escapist,
spy/terrorist/thriller-killer stories, by Brad Thor or Daniel Silva, are
balanced with some learning. A ski friend gave me “American Sniper” by Chris
Kyle, an autobiography of America’s most prolific sniper, a Navy SEAL. I’ve
seen the movie; I know how it ends. The book is rough but superb.
I took away a profound and
deep sense of the necessary, but noble, skill set that comes into force when
America sends its young, even not so young, men to train and deploy, through
times of sheer boredom as well as so-called “kinetic contact” with the enemies
of America for what can be hours or even days of exhausting, draining,
terrifying and rewarding heroism.
That calling can drive
soldiers, sailors, flyers and Marines to nearly obsessive devotion to the
mission in deployment after deployment, even into reenlistments that take a
mighty toll on, in Kyle’s case, his wife and children. As Kyle relates his
personal story, you easily become drawn into his all-consuming experience. Kill
after shot after hit—over 160 by all accounts—have to be placed in perspective
that every enemy, every militant, terrorist and combatant he killed,
represented usually several American fighters that would have died had he not
pulled the trigger.
There is the ever-present
pressure to justify his decision, to confirm the circumstances if questioned by
a military lawyer because of an Iraqi civilian that knows the value of
propaganda and accusation to undermine the mission of our military. Very often,
seeming futility breeds lowered morale that shows itself in the cynicism toward
the Iraqis he was there to liberate. There remain the willing-to-die sacrifices
for the brothers-in-arms around him. It’s a great read.
I bought Lewis Sorley’s “A
Better War” because it examined the post-1967 years of the Vietnam War or, as
the subtitle reads, “The unexamined victories and final tragedy of America’s
last years in Vietnam.” I had read that the war was winnable in several ways
and times. The loss of those opportunities cascaded into the national disaster,
even disgrace, of America having nobly gone to fulfill its obligation to
prevent the communist takeover of South Vietnam, but leaving in shame, defeat
and the fall of that same nation’s people to the totalitarian North Vietnam.
No one can honestly look at
the post-war “reeducation camp” slaughter, the desperation of the “boat people”
lost at sea, and the “killing fields” of Cambodia—and not wish that it had gone
another way, any way that would have achieved a win for us and South Vietnam.
Even the Islamic terrorist massacres, brought about by Al Qaeda under Osama bin
Laden, relate to inspiration he took from America’s defeat in Vietnam,
believing that we were a “paper tiger.”
The first lost opportunity, if you will, that Sorley—a West Point
graduate, Army veteran, Pentagon staffer and CIA official—points to transpired
while I was in high school. General Westmoreland spent 4 years from 1964 to
1968 conducting “big sweeps” with a “large force” military, meeting and
defeating the North Vietnam Army (NVA) and Viet Cong they found.
As often as not, the enemy
forces, recognizing the futility of relying on set battles and the massive
casualties to their forces, would fade away and retreat into the endless
jungles while Westmoreland’s after-action press releases would hold up “body
counts,” useless for actual measurements of progress in a war where the NVA
could endlessly replenish its troops.
General Creighton Abrams’
strategy, begun in 1968, of counter-insurgency, “clear and hold” pacification,
adapted to the actual war the enemy, NVA and VC, were conducting. When the simultaneous
trends of interdicting and destroying enemy stockpiles of pre-placed materiel,
withering attacks on the supply of men infiltrating through the “Ho Chi Minh”
trail, and the improved security in villages that supported their elected
leaders and the South’s military—when that strategy created the grounds for
securing protection and freedom for the South’s people from attacks, we were
winning.
Unfortunately, too many years
were wasted, using Westmoreland’s tactics, for the domestic support to be sustained,
leading to bombing cutbacks, pauses and cessations under both Presidents
Johnson and Nixon. Those bombing halts and the “peace process” were used by the
Communists to prepare for further battle and by Ambassador Harriman, an antiwar
fanatic, to make concessions that led to untenable losses of military advantage
and the ability to prevail.
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